Regulating Union Representation Election Campaign Tactics: A Comparative Study of Private and Public Sector Approaches by Ray, Douglas E. et al.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 66 | Issue 3 Article 10
1987
Regulating Union Representation Election
Campaign Tactics: A Comparative Study of Private
and Public Sector Approaches
Douglas E. Ray
University of Toledo College of Law
Jennifer Gallagher
University of Toledo College of Law
Nancy A. Butler
University of Toledo College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Douglas E. Ray, Jennifer Gallagher, and Nancy A. Butler, Regulating Union Representation Election Campaign Tactics: A Comparative
Study of Private and Public Sector Approaches, 66 Neb. L. Rev. (1987)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol66/iss3/10
Douglas E. Ray*
Jennifer Gallagher**
Nancy A. Butler***
Regulating Union Representation
Election Campaign Tactics: A
Comparative Study of Private and
Public Sector Approaches
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................................... 532
II. Union Organizers and the Employer's Property ........... 537
III. Regulating Employer Campaign Speech and Tactics ...... 545
A. Employer Threats ..................................... 547
B. Employer Promises and Grants of Benefits ........... 551
C. "Captive Audience" Meetings ......................... 554
IV. Regulating Union Campaign Tactics ....................... 556
V. Regulating Misrepresentation ............................. 557
VI. Conclusion ................................................. 560
I. INTRODUCTION
Because the National Labor Relations Act,' which just observed its
fiftieth anniversary, far predates the collective bargaining laws of the
approximately forty states2 authorizing public employee collective
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1. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982)).
2. Wisconsin was the first state to enact a public employee bargaining bill with ap-
proximately forty states following suit. See Ashmus & Bumpass, Public Sector
Bargaining in a Democracy - An Assessment of the Ohio Public Employee Col-
lective Bargaining Law 33 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 593, 595 (1984-85). This increase in
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bargaining, it is not surprising that it has substantially influenced pub-
lic employee labor law.3 The National Labor Relations Board4 and the
federal courts have extensive experience in interpreting the NLRA,
which experience can benefit the states. In addition, many state stat-
utes governing public sector collective bargaining are modeled after
the NLRA.5 The use of the NLRA as a model provides an abundance
of private sector precedent which can add much needed predictability
to the regulation of public employee bargaining. This is especially im-
portant in those states which have only recently adopted comprehen-
sive public employee bargaining statutes.
the number of public employee collective bargaining laws is due in part to the
rapid growth of the public sector itself. The number of state and local govern-
ment employees has more than doubled in recent years-from 5,069,000 in 1956 to
14,316,000 in 1986. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOY-
MENT AND EARNiNGS, Table B-2 (1986). The percentage of state and local govern-
ment employees represented by unions was 43.1% in 1985. Id Table 58.
3. Public employee labor law has traditionally been influenced by the private labor
movement. Historically, the public employee movement began as a way to com-
pete with private employees. For example: 'Private sector employers had agreed
to a ten hour work day in 1835, and ultimately public employers also acquiesced,
not necessarily because they sanctioned union-type activity on the part of their
employees, but rather because they... had to ensure the availability of their
labor supply." Project" Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employ-
ment, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 887, 893 (1972).
In succeeding years, public employees had a secondary role in the labor
movement.
Any benefits secured by these [public] employees generally resulted
from the fact that the private sector labor union in their particular in-
dustry had already secured such benefits. Public employees benefited
from the fact that public employers adopted the policy of making pay
rates and labor standards conform to those prevailing in private employ-
ment in the surrounding area.
Id. at 894.
4. The National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter NLRB], is an adjudicative body
heading the federal agency bearing the same name. Section 3(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, provides that the NLRB shall consist of five
members "appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate." 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982).
5. Virtually all of the public sector collective bargaining statutes encompass to some
extent the rights granted public employees. These statutes often parallel the
statement of employee rights in section seven of the NLRA. For example, the
Pennsylvania statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 1101.401 (Purdon Supp. 1986), pro-
vides that:
It shall be lawful for public employees to organize, form, join or assist in
employee organizations or to engage in lawful concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection or to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own free choice and
such employees shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities, except as may be required pursuant to a maintenance of mem-
bership provision in a collective bargaining agreement.
R. SMrrH, H. EDWAms, R. CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
(1974).
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Despite these strong reasons for following NLRA precedent in the
public sector, the NLRA may not always provide the best model for
regulating public sector labor relations6 because the public and private
sectors differ in many ways that affect labor relations.7 Public em-
ployers have different packages of rights and duties than do private
employers. Public employees, too, are different, enjoying constitu-
tional protections unavailable to private sector employees.8 These dif-
6. The possible inappropriateness of blind adoption of NLRA precedent has been
pointed out by at least one commentator indicating that:
[S]tates may have adopted some statutory unfair labor practices without
much or any evidence that they were needed. In a number of instances,
it appears that the mere listing of unfair labor practices in the NLRA
prompted states to include them in their own statutes.... An obvious
example is the NLRA's prohibition against featherbedding. In practice
the section has proved unenforceable and is now virtually a dead letter.
The NLRA sections forbidding secondary pressures, excessive compul-
sory initiation fees and dues and certain kinds of organizational picket-
ing have also been ineffective, yet some states have incorporated them in
their statutes.
Aaron, Unfair Labor Practices and the Right to Strike in the Public Sector Has
the National Labor Relations Act Been a Good Model?, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1097,
1100-01 (1986) (citations omitted). Because of the differences between private
and public sector employment it has been noted that public employees should
receive different treatment from that afforded their private sector counterparts.
Developments in the Law - Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1611, 1616
(1983-84). "Whether the NLRA model is emulated or rejected, however, the pre-
occupation with the private sector system is unfortunate. Simply to import the
private sector bargaining regime into the public sector would be to neglect the
special role of the public employer as representative of the public interest." Id. at
1681.
7. This difference is often noted in the statutory language employed by the states.
For example, the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act notes that:
The relationships between the public, public employees, and employer
governing bodies involve responsibilities to the public and a need for co-
operation and employment protection which are different from those
found in the private sector. The importance or necessity of some services
to the public can create imbalances in the relative bargaining power be-
tween public employees and employers. As a result, unique approaches
to negotiations and resolutions of disputes between public employees and
employers are necessary.
Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.01
(West Supp. 1987).
8. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985), the Court held
that due process protection for permanent state employees requires that tenured
employees be provided pretermination notice and opportunity to respond as well
as posttermination administrative review. See also, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 573, 577 (1972) (recognizing property interest in public employment
where "legitimate claim of entitlement" exists, and recognizing that discharge of
a public employee might implicate a liberty interest). Public employees have also
been recognized to have free speech rights, see Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968) (letter critical of school board policies sent to newspaper by high
school teacher) and constitutionally protected free association rights, Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). These rights can often limit areas that
would be subject to employer control in the private sector. See, e.g., East Hart-
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ferences may sometimes require states to modify the NLRA model.
The peculiar needs of individual states may also necessitate modifica-
tions so that any one model may not serve each jurisdiction equally
well.
In addition, private sector labor law under the NLRA has not al-
ways been predictable or stable and has been the subject of substantial
criticism and debate in the past few years.9 The law with regard to the
effect of misrepresentation in the pre-election campaign, for example,
has changed three times from 1977 to 1982.10 In recent years, a
number of other well-established precedents have also been overruled
by the National Labor Relations Board.31
ford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that
teacher's first and fourteenth amendment academic freedom and liberty interests
infringed upon by board of education dress code requiring male teachers to wear
neckties).
Moreover, the NLRA grants private employees "the right to self-organization,
to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities .... " 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1982). Absent the inclusion of these first amendment-like rights of free
expression and freedom of association in the statute, they would not be available
to private employees because private entities are not constrained by the first
amendment. Public employees, however, are protected through the incorpora-
tion of first amendment protections by the fourteenth amendment. For a more
detailed discussion see generally Ashmus and Bumpass, Public Sector Bargaining
in a Democracy--An Assessment of the Ohio Public Collective Bargaining Law,
33 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 593 (1984-85). Additionally, the right to be free of threat of
discharge in an employment-at-will situation has recently been made available to
private sector employees not covered by collective bargaining agreements, while
employees in the public sector have had civil service protection since the late
nineteenth century. I&
9. See generally, J. ATLESON, VALUES AND AssUMPTIONs iN AMERICAN LABOR LAW(1983). The debate can sometimes become quite heated. See Finkin, Revisionism
in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REv. 23 (1984) and Klare, Traditional Labor Law Schol-
arship and the Crisis of Collective Bargaining Law: A Reply to Professor Finhin,
44 MD. L. REV. 731 (1985).
10. See infra notes 128-48 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984), affd sub nom. Hotel Employ-
ees Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985) (overruling PPG Indus., Inc.,
251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980) and expanding employer's ability to interrogate union
supporters); Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984) (overruling Cor-
onet Casuals, 207 N.L.R.B. 304 (1973) and expanding types of strike misconduct
justifying discharge); Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B.
601 (1984), affid sub. nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (overrul-
ing Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co,, 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enJfd, 602 F.2d
1302 (9th Cir. 1979)); Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 483 (1984), remanded sub.
nor. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 313
(1985) (overruling Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975) and narrowing
the concept of protected concerted activity); Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977),
W. denied, 581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1978); University of Chicago, 210 N.L.R.B. 190
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For these and other reasons, scholars and commentators have be-
gun to question whether the private sector NLRA model is well-suited
to all areas of public sector labor law.12 The purpose of this Article is
to address this question as it pertains to the public sector pre-election
campaign.
If the NLRA model, as currently interpreted and applied, is
adopted in the public sector, an employer will be allowed to campaign
extensively on its premises without giving equal access or, indeed, any
access, to union organizers.13 The employer's speeches and other cam-
paign messages will, however, be subject to reasonably intense scru-
tiny. Should the employer's campaign actions be deemed coercive,
threatening or otherwise interfere with employees' free choice, a
union election loss will be overturned and a new election held. Should
the employer's actions be deemed so coercive that their impact is not
likely to abate, a union which has achieved a majority by means of
authorization cards can be recognized as the majority representative
even though it has lost an election or no election has been held.14
Union messages will also be subjected to similar scrutiny.15 On the
other hand, campaign messages that are inaccurate, even when inten-
tionally inaccurate, will not be the basis for overturning elections.16
This Article will, for each of the above areas, describe the status of
private sector labor law and examine some of the recent criticisms and
suggestions for change. Decisions of state courts and agencies will
then be reviewed to determine to what degree states have followed the
private sector model in these areas and to what degree, if any, the
states have taken into account any differences between the public and
private sectors and the criticisms of the current status of private sector
labor law. It is the view of the authors that while adoption of the
NLRA model is generally appropriate, states have the duty and oppor-
tunity to determine whether all the basic assumptions of private sec-
tor labor law are applicable to the public sector. As states develop
their own expertise, principles should be devised to protect employee
free choice, while at the same time taking into account the particular
needs of the public sector and the individual jurisdiction. Because the
private sector model sets the standard, however, deviations should be
clearly articulated and justified so that those attempting to apply the
law in the future will have guidance from, and confidence in, the law.
(1974), e7nf denied, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975), (expanding employer's right to
relocate work from unionized plant to nonunion plant).
12. See Aaron, supra note 6.
13. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nutone and Avondale), 357 U.S. 357 (1958);
James Hotel Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 761 (1963).
14. NLRB v. Gissel Packaging Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
15. See inkfra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
16. See Midland Nat'l Life Ins., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
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II. UNION ORGANIZERS AND THE EMPLOYER'S PROPERTY
Whether private sector rules governing union access to employees
and to the employer's property are appropriate in the public sector is
an issue that is certain to be much debated. Even within the private
sector there is controversy concerning the Supreme Court's adoption
of separate rules for solicitation by employee and nonemployee union
organizers.17 While this dual analysis of access within the private sec-
tor is premised on traditional principles of property law, such princi-
ples are not uniformly applicable in the public sector. For this reason,
the balance may be struck differently in the public sector to allow
union organizers greater access to the workplace than is allowed in the
private sector.
To understand the issue, it is important to note that even in the
private sector courts have had difficulty distinguishing between consti-
tutionally protected and unprotected property interests.'8 Even more
complex definitional issues arise when comparing the rights of public
and private property owners. Historically, private property interests
included "an inherent liberty to make decisions concerning activities
on or affecting the property without government interference."19
These rights in private property, however, have not remained static.
The Supreme Court in Nebbia v. New York2O adopted the view that
when private property becomes "clothed with a public [interest]," or
used in a way that affects the public, it becomes subject to the state's
police power.21 The Supreme Court thus has recognized that the use
made of private property may limit the rights of the landowner in re-
lation to the needs of the state.22
17. See generally Note, Property Rights and Job Security: Workplace Solicitation by
Non-employee Union Organizers, 94 YALE L.J. 374 (1984) [hereinafter Workplace
Solicitation]. (The Note examines the rationale underlying the doctrinal distinc-
tion between employee and nonemployee solicitation. The author argues that
such a distinction allows a "trivial employer property claim to undermine em-
ployees' statutory right to advance their interests through self-organization.") Id
18. For example, the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) acknowledged that it has been unable to develop any "set
formula" for determining when private property has been taken for public use,
instead basing its determination on ad hoc, factual inquiries. Id. at 124. See gener-
ally Pattersen, Property Rights in the Balance - The Burger Court and Constitu-
tional Property, 43 MD. L. REV. 518 (1984).
19. W. ScoTr, IN PuRsurr OF HApPIass: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY
FRoM THE SEvENTEENTH To THE TwENTiEr CENTURY, 137-58 (1977).
20. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
21. Id. at 534. The Court upheld state imposed price controls on milk. Additionally,
the Court stated that the expectations that accompany private property that af-
fects the public must encompass an expectation that the government may regu-
late the owner's use of that property. Id at 539.
22. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). The question of prop-
erty use affecting the rights of private property owners also permeates Court de-
cisions concerning intrusions by invitees. In Pruneyard, a property owner
1987]
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In the area of labor law, the Court has held that an employer-prop-
erty owner may not prohibit nondisruptive, pro-union activity by em-
ployees on the private employer's property. In Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB,23 the Supreme Court held that employee solicitation of
union membership and distribution of organizational literature is al-
lowable in the workplace except when an employer can show that
such activity tends to interfere with production, discipline or safety.24
By opening the premises to employees, the employer-property owner
subordinates certain property rights.25 Thus, the Court has recog-
nized the importance of allowing employee solicitation by union or-
ganizers at the workplace, even if the workplace is owned by a private
employer. Employee solicitation is encompassed within the right of
self-organization granted employees by section seven of the NLRA.26
While the importance of workplace solicitation in the private sec-
tor has been recognized, a distinction has been maintained between
employee and nonemployee union solicitation. The property rights of
the employer are granted deference in the latter situation.7 Nonem-
ployee union organizers have generally been denied access based on
the 1956 case of NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.28 In Babcock & Wil-
cox, the Supreme Court held that employers may deny access to non-
employee union organizers seeking to contact employees on the
claimed that a fifth amendment taking had occurred when a state law prohibited
the owner of a large shopping center from excluding persons who were con-
ducting orderly speech and petition activities. The Court rejected the owner's
property interest stressing that the shopping center was open to the public. Id at
83.
23. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
24. See also Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (the Court upheld an agency
order requiring the employer to allow employees to distribute a union newsletter
in nonworking areas and on nonworking time); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 483 (1978) (employees could engage in union activity in a hospital cafeteria,
although it was used by visitors and patients, because any interference with cafe-
teria operators did not affect the primary functions of the hospital).
25. However, the property owner does retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in
areas of his property outside the scope of the "invitation." Portions of the prem-
ises not open to employees are sometimes protected against intrusion. See NLRB
v. Visceglia, 498 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1974) (employees assigned to one building do not
have a right of access to separate building).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) provides that: "Employees shall have the right to self-or-
ganization, to form, join or assist labor organizations and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection .... "
27. Recognition of the private employer's property right to deny access for purposes
of union solicitation turns on whether those engaging in solicitation possess sec-
tion seven rights. Nonemployee union organizers do not possess section seven
rights. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976). "The locus [of the balance
between employee rights of self-organization and employer property rights]...
may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on the nature and
strength of the respective § 7 rights.., asserted in any given context."
28. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
[Vol. 66:532
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employer's premises so long as "reasonable efforts by the union
through other available channels of communication" will allow it to
reach the employees with its message.2 9 The union faces a "heavy
burden" in showing alternative channels of communication are inade-
quate.3 0 Thus, the employer's property interests have been held to
outweigh any interest the employees may have in hearing the union
organizer's message. Unions can be denied access to the employer's
premises even where the employer uses its premises to give "captive
audience" speeches in which it communicates its anti-union views to
employees on working time.3 1
Critics of the current system have argued that the balance struck
in Babcock & Wilcox ignores the importance of the workplace to em-
ployees,3 2 and that nonemployee union organizers should be given di-
rect access to employees on the employer's premises.33 This, it is
argued, would be a "much more effective way to permit unions to
29. Id. at 112.
30. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180, 205 (1978). Consequently, nonemployee union organizers are rarely granted
access to private property to solicit union membership and distribute organiza-
tional literature.
31. See inlfra notes 112-17 and accompanying text for discussion of "captive audience"
speeches. See also James Hotel Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 761 (1963); NLRB v. United
Steelworkers (Nutone and Avondale), 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
32. It has been noted too, that this protection of employer property interests creates a
near conclusive presumption against union access to employer property. Note,
Still as Strangers: Nonemployee Union Organizers on Private Commercial Prop-
erty, 62 TEx. L. REV. 111, 124 (1983). In Babcock & Wilcox, the Court stated that
"[a]ccommodation between [§ 7 and property rights] must be obtained with as lit-
tle destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other." 351
U.S. at 112. By holding that an employer may deny access where alternative
means of communication exist, the Court did not establish a balancing test of
accommodation but rather, established a presumption in favor of the employer
and in support of employer property rights. See Note, NLRB Orders Granting
Unions Access to Company Property, 68 CoRNELL L. REv. 895 (1983) ("[A]Ilmost
any degree of contact establishes the existence of alternative means of access."
Id. at 902. The Court has found that the union does have "reasonable" alternative
channels of communication available if there is any opportunity, however limited,
for contact with employees. See Sears, 436 U.S. 180,205 (1978). See also Hudgens,
424 U.S. 507 (1976). These forms of contact include home visits, correspondence
and advertising campaigns. See Zimny, Access of Union Organizers to "Private"
Property, 25 LAB. L.J. 618, 619 (1974). Because of these possible alternatives, ac-
cess to private employer property is denied in all but exceptional cases. See Hus-
key Oil v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 643, 647-48 (10th Cir. 1982) (Board access order
enforced at remote Alaskan worksite). In fact "the balance struck by the Board
and the courts under the Babcock & Wilcox accommodation principle has rarely
been in favor of trespassory organizational activity." Sears, 436 U.S. at 205.
Hence the Court has jealously guarded employer property interests in the private
sector by denying nonemployee union access, and by so doing has arguably re-
stricted employee access to pro-union information on company premises.
33. Getman, Ruminations on Union Organizing in the Private Sector, 53 U. Caic. L.
REV. 45, 70-72 (1986).
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overcome whatever coercive advantage the employer obtains from its
position" than is regulation of the coercive impact of employer
speech.3 4 This would permit unions to make an immediate response to
employer threats rather than waiting for lengthy Board proceedings.
Further, it is argued, "the very fact of union access would be an effec-
tive message to the employees that the law has the power to grant
unions a significant role despite employer opposition.... [and] provide
[t]he missing ingredient of free choice.... ,,35
These arguments favoring union access to employees in the work-
place, which heretofore have been unsuccessful in the private sector,
may be more persuasive in the public sector. Public employers do not
have the significant private property interests protected in Babcock &
Wilcox. Public employees are different from private employees, too,
having recognized property interests and due process protections not
provided employees in the private sector.3 6 For these reasons, the bal-
ance may well be struck differently in the public sector to allow em-
ployees to hear the union message at the workplace without a showing
by the union that alternative channels of communication are inade-
quate. Further, the mere availability of alternative forms of commu-
nication, which forms the basis of the Babcock & Wilcox decision, does
not guarantee the effectiveness of such alternatives.37 Thus, before
blindly adopting the federal rule denying all access to nonemployee
organizers, states should consider the issue in light of the importance
of workplace access and the different property interests involved in
public sector employment. There is some indication that at least a few
state legislaturesa8 and boards have begun to address this issue.
34. Id at 71.
35. 1d.
36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for discussion of protections not provided
employees in the private sector.
37. This point was at issue in May Dept. Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), en~force-
ment denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963). The employer addressed employees on
company property and company time while enforcing a broad rule against union
solicitation. The Board granted union access to company property and found that
alternative means of communication were inadequate in light of the fact that the
employer's speech violated § 8(a)(1). The court of appeals reversed the Board's
decision holding that the Board should only consider the existence of alternative
forms of communication and not attempt to determine their adequacy. The court
stated that "[t]he determination of whether or not the... [e]mployer['s] conduct
produced an imbalance in opportunities for organizational communications is de-
pendent upon the existence or nonexistence of alternative methods of communi-
cation open to the union." 316 F.2d at 799. See also NLRB Orders, supra note 32.
38. The Tennessee Education Professional Negotiations Act states that a board of
education may not:
refuse to permit a professional employees' organization to have access at
reasonable times to areas in which professional employees work, to use
institutional bulletin boards, mailboxes, or other communication media,
or to use institutional facilities at reasonable times for the purpose of
meeting concerned with the exercise of the rights guaranteed by this
[Vol. 66:532
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Critics of the current private sector system have argued for change.
They argue that even where alternative channels of communication
exist, union access to employees at the workplace is of paramount im-
portance because a successful organizational campaign often depends
upon the dissemination of information at the workplace.3 9 Indeed,
employer monopolization of the workplace is often critical to the em-
ployer's success in defeating unionization 40 because, under current
law, the employer alone has the right to access and use of his property
and owes no obligation to nonemployee organizers.
Although dealing with employee solicitation at the workplace,4 ' at
least one state board has specifically recognized that different prop-
[act]; provided, that if a representative has been selected or designated
pursuant to the provisions of this [act], a board of education may deny
such access and/or usage to any professional employees' organization
other than the representative until such time as a lawful challenge to the
majority status of the representative is sustained pursuant to this [act].
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-5-609(a)(4) (1978).
39. One commentator has noted that:
During the course of my study, I felt on several occasions that unions lost
elections which they could have won but for campaign errors. The most
common mistake was failure to convey personal interest in the employ-
ees. This mistake took several forms: over-reliance on formal campaign
literature ... and most significantly, not getting to know the rank-and-
file members.
See Getman, supra note 33, at 60. The most effective way to combat these poten-
tial errors would be through personal contact with employees at the workplace.
In this way the union organizer will have the opportunity to get to know the
employees and attempt to address their particular needs and concerns. Routine
campaign tactics and prepackaged messages, no matter how well-prepared, are
often inadequate in accomplishing this task. I& at 59-60.
40. J. GETmAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECIONs:
LAW AND REALITY (1976). The authors noted that:
The employer tends to be far more successful in attracting employees to
meetings on working time and premises than does the union in at-
tracting them to meetings outside working hours and away from com-
pany premises. Eighty-three percent of the sample attended company
meetings, while only 36 percent attended union meetings. Furthermore,
those employees who attended union meetings tended to be union sup-
porters. The company, then, has a great advantage in communicating
with the undecided and those not already committed to it. This advan-
tage is particularly important since attendance at union meetings is sig-
nificantly related to switching to the union.
I. at 156-57. See also Workplace Solicitation, supra note 17.
41. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for discussion of employee union solicita-
tion at the workplace. The states have generally followed the private sector rules
concerning solicitation and distribution of union materials. For example, the Or-
egon Board in Gresham Grade Teachers Ass'n v. Gresham Grade School Dist.,
[1980-1983 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining
Cas.) 42,685 (Or. Nov. 13, 1981) stated that:
In accord with federal precedent, an employer's rule regulating distribu-
tion of material in nonwork areas or on nonwork time is presumptively
invalid unless special circumstances exist to make the rule necessary to
maintain production or discipline.... While a rule prohibiting distribu-
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erty interests are involved in public sector employment. In Dade
Teachers Ass'n v. School Bd. of Dade County,42 the applicable access
rule prohibited employees from one job site from entering another job
site for purposes of solicitation. Such a total ban was held to be pre-
sumptively invalid in light of the fact that:
[E]mployer interests in property rights did not justify the rule. A public em-
ployer has a significant management interest in restricting access to publicly
owned property only to the extent necessary to accomplish the purpose for
which the property was dedicated, and management interests in denying ac-
cess to all nonemployees for such reasons as security is [sic] not necessarily
sufficient to impede the significant interest of public employees in multi-site
bargaining units to communicate with each other for organizational
purposes.4 3
The issue of employer property interests in the public sector was
also addressed by the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board in a
case deciding the question of access by union agents to public property.
In Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd. v. City of Woonsocket,44 the
tion of material in working areas during working time is presumptively
valid unless discriminatorily promulgated or enforced.
An across the board preclusion of all organizational activity during employee
worktime was deemed an unfair labor practice as an overly broad restriction of
employee rights in Employees of South Park School Dist. v. South Park School
Dist., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bar-
gaining Cas.) 41,365 (Pa. Sept. 26, 1979). The Pennsylvania Board found that
although a no-solicitation policy is presumptively valid when applied only to
working time, this presumption fails once the ban extends to nonworking peri-
ods. Absent a compelling employer business interest, a blanket prohibition of all
union activity can not stand.
Similarly, in Florida, the Public Employees Relation Commission held it un-
lawful for a public employer to prohibit solicitation by employees during the
hours a college is in operation (excepting only the lunch period). Okaloosa-Wal-
ton Higher Educ. Ass'n v. Okaloosa-Walton Jr. College Bd. of Trustees, [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.)
40,020 (Fla. June 29, 1977). According to the Board, solicitation and distribution
could only be limited to the nonworking hours of either the solicitor or the pro-
spective member-not to the hours the college is in operation. In addition, only
minor limitations would be permitted on the areas in which solicitation and dis-
tribution may take place.
In University of Mich. v. Organizing Comm. for Clericals, [1980-1983 Transfer
Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 42,365 (Mich.
April 16, 1981), a university employer guideline that banned the distribution of
union materials by employees in nonworking areas and during nonworking times
constituted unlawful interference. Any limitation of employee access must be:
"(1) A valid no-solicitation/no-distribution rule limiting access solely to working
areas or justified by business necessity, (2) that is officially promulgated and
clearly disseminated to all employees, and (3) applies to all employees seeking
access to the building for any purpose."
42. [1980-1983 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining
Cas.) 42,574 (Fla. Sept. 22, 1981).
43. Id.
44. 3 Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 43,730 (R.I. July 18,
1984).
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Board held that the city interfered with a union representation elec-
tion by unlawfully denying union agents access to city property to
place election flyers on city property and to visit employees. The
Board reasoned that "while an employer had the right to regulate rea-
sonable hours for union activity, it did not have the right to completely
prohibit access of union members .... ."45 The Board held that the city
had interfered with the exercise of a free and untrammeled election
decision by denying union agents access to the property.
Similarly, in American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employ-
ees v. Coos County Comm'rs,4 6 the New Hampshire Board granted the
union a limited right of access to the employer's premises to insure
that all the employees were aware of the union organizing drive. The
union was denied access only to those areas that were not part of the
employer's place of business or were not generally open to the pub-
lic.47 With this ruling, the New Hampshire Board implicitly acknowl-
edged the importance of workplace solicitation, while recognizing the
more limited property interest of public employers.
This balance was recently examined by the Ohio State Employ-
ment Relations Board (SERB) in Hamilton County Welfare Dept.4s
In 1983, management at the Hamilton County Department of Human
Services began an organized campaign to oppose unionization. This
campaign included use of a consulting firm that recommended a vari-
ety of improvements. Several of the "key" recommendations49 were
incorporated into a March, 1984, document entitled "Employee Repre-
sentation Philosophy."5 0 The Board noted this action by the employer
to illustrate the significance the employer attached to workplace com-
munication, and to "provide a backdrop against which the balance be-
tween the employer's solicitation/distribution policies applicable to
the employee organization and the employer's own actions may be
measured."5 1 The employer had a solicitation/distribution policy
which stated that nonemployees may solicit and distribute informa-
tion in the public parking lots, so long as there was no interference
with people coming to or leaving work. Nonemployees were not al-
45. I&
46. 3 Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 43,920 (N.H. May 9,
1984).
47. In Coos, the chapel of a county nursing home was not required to be open to union
organizers as it was not part of the employer's place of business and not generally
open to the public.
48. 3 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. 3036 (May 12, 1986).
49. The purpose of such recommendations was the creation of an environment in
which the employees "would not desire a union." This included suggestions that
"things were going to get better" and that working conditions would improve. Id.
at VII-58.
50. Id. The "Employee Representation Philosophy" dealt with a variety of changes
in personnel policy and employee benefits.
51. I&
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
lowed access to department working and nonworking areas for any
purpose because of the need to maintain client confidentiality.52 Em-
ployees were allowed to solicit only during nonworking time. The em-
ployer recommended that such solicitation occur in nonwork areas to
avoid interruptions of those on working time.53
In contrast to these access restrictions, the employer's labor rela-
tions advisors were given essentially unrestricted access to the em-
ployer's premises. In addition:
[They discussed the employer's campaign [against union representation] with
supervisors on the supervisor's working time. Supervisors distributed em-
ployer literature to employees during working hours in working areas. Em-
ployees were encouraged to ask questions "at your convenience" about the
employer's election position. Thus the S/D [solicitation/distribution] policy
was not applied to those conducting the employer's campaign against
representation. 54
This lack of evenhandedness prompted SERB to set forth several ac-
cess principles to insure fairness in access during the ordered re-elec-
tion campaign. The Board noted that the standard for fairness could
be found in Babcock & Wilcox. The Board chose not to emphasize the
question of available alternate channels of communication, but rather
highlighted that Babcock & Wilcox prohibits employers from discrimi-
nating against a union by allowing other distributions on employer
premises.5 5 The Board stated that for nonemployees seeking access to
the interior of the premises, the employer was to be given twenty-four
52. The nonemployee rule reads in full:
Persons not employed by the Hamilton County Welfare Department and
off-duty Welfare Department staff may solicit or distribute for any law-
ful purpose on public parking lots so long as there is no interference with
persons coming to and leaving work. Nonemployees are not permitted
access to department working and nonworking areas for any purpose to
ensure continued client confidentiality and the uninterrupted delivery of
agency services. Former employees and spouses and children of current
employees may be granted access to specified work or nonwork areas
with prior approval or [sic] Personnel Services.
53. The employee rule reads in pertinent part:
Employees of the Hamilton County Welfare Department may solicit for
any lawful purpose during nonworking time. It is recommended that
any solicitation occur in nonwork areas to avoid interruptions to staff
who remain on working time. Employees are not permitted to solicit,
conduct personal business, or distribute printed matter or goods for any
purpose during working time of the employee soliciting or the employee
being solicited. Employees are not permitted to distribute printed mat-
ter for any purpose in work areas.
54. Id at VII-59.
55. Id at VII-60, n.32. The NLRB would reach the same result on this issue. See e.g.,
Midwest Regional Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. NLRB,
564 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1977) enforcing 222 N.L.R.B. 161 (1976) (holding invalid
distribution of procompany literature while banning pro-union literature).
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hour notice of a visit.56 In addition, all solicitation and distribution
was to be confined to nonwork areas and during nonwork times.5 7
Nonemployees were to be allowed access to parking lots without ad-
vance notice to the employer. With regard to employee-solicitors, so-
licitation and distribution activity was to be allowed in both work and
nonwork areas so long as both employees are on nonworking time.
Finally, as a general rule, the employer was allowed to regulate any
activity which disrupted or interfered with normal work on the em-
ployer's premises.5 8
Thus, a number of states seem to agree with Professor Getman and
others that unions should have access to employees at the workplace.
Whether these decisions are based on perceived differences between
public and private property or on a general rejection of the balance
struck in Babcock & Wilcox is not yet clear. It remains for future de-
cisions to fully explain the rationale and limits of these new doctrines.
III. REGULATING EMPLOYER CAMPAIGN
SPEECH AND TACTICS
The degree to which a governmental agency should regulate em-
ployer speech and tactics in an organizational campaign is another is-
sue which the states may choose to examine independently of the
NLRA model. While private sector law is somewhat settled, observers
have raised substantial questions about its foundation and efficacy.
The NLRB plays a substantial role in regulating private sector em-
ployer speech in the pre-election campaign. Under Section 8(a)(1),5 9
employer speech or acts which the NLRB believes to have coerced or
restrained employees in the exercise of protected rights may be
grounds to order an election that was lost by the union to be rerun. In
exceptional cases in which the Board finds unfair labor practices seri-
ous enough to prevent a fair rerun of the election, it can order the
employer to bargain with the union despite the union's failure to win
the election.60
The content of pre-election speech is carefully scrutinized by the
Board. For example, employer predictions as to the consequences of
unionization must be "carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact
56. This notice must be accompanied by a list of persons and alternates intending
access and a designated time.
57. The employer must designate at least two, but no more than five, nonwork areas
for such activity.
58. The Ohio SERB has now taken steps to apply the Hamilton County access princi-
ples to all representation elections. See SERB Proposed Rule Revisions § 4117-5-
06 (proposed Nov. 26, 1986).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). The section provides it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer- "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed under Section 7."
60. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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to convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable conse-
quences beyond his control."6 ' Even where employer speech is not
considered an unfair labor practice because it does not constitute a
"threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit,"62 such speech may
still provide the basis for overturning an election result if it upsets the
"laboratory conditions" under which an election is ideally to be held.63
In recent years, two empirical studies have generated substantial
debate over the role of NLRB regulation of employer practices before
an election.64 These studies suggest that unfair labor practices by the
employer have little, if any, impact on employees. In Union Represen-
tation Elections: Law and Reality,65 the authors argue that the Board
has played too active a role in policing campaign conduct. They found
that employees begin an election campaign with firm opinions and
that over eighty percent do not change these opinions throughout the
campaign.66 Further, they argue that employees often do not pay
much attention to the campaign and that even threats and reprisals
have little impact.67
It is unclear whether these criticisms have affected the public sec-
tor because the state courts and boards have not been consistent in
their assessment of public employer pre-election campaign tactics. In
most instances the state courts and boards have patterned their regu-
lations governing public employers pre-election campaign tactics on
the NLRA model.68 Occasionally the state courts and boards have not
61. Id at 618.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
63. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
64. See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 38, and Cooper, Authori-
zation Cards and Union Representation Election Outcome: An Empirical Assess.
ment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel Decision, 79 Nw.
U.L. REV. 87 (1984).
65. See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 38.
66. Id, at 72-73.
67. Id. at 96-97. Others have disagreed and argued that it has not been proven that
there is no connection between employer coercion and employee votes and that,
indeed, there is an "inherent plausibility of the notion that employees will re-
spond to threats to the jobs that are crucial to their lives ... ." Weiler, Promises
to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization under the NLRA, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1783-84 (1983). See also, Eames, An Analysis of the Union
Voting Study from a Trade-Unionist's Point of View, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1181
(1976); Kochan, Legal Nonsense, Empirical Examination and Policy Evaluation,
29 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1976). But see, Goldberg, Getman & Brett, Union Repre-
sentation Elections - Law and Reality: The Authors Respond to the Critics, 79
MICH. L. REV. 564 (1981).
68. For a discussion of the convergence theory which argues that the private sector
and public sector are on parallel lines of development see Troy, The Convergence
of Public and Private Industrial Relations Systems in the United States, 5 GOV'T
UNION REv. 37 (1984). According to this theory, a system of rules will evolve for
public sector labor relations which will mirror those set out by the NLRB. But
see, Felker, Convergence As a Theory of Public Sector Labor Phenomenon: A Cri-
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emulated the federal rules applicable to private sector pre-election
campaign tactics, but have instead encouraged less restrictive stan-
dards for the public sector parties. The rationales for such decisions,
however, have not always been clearly explained.
A. Employer Threats
An area that has been the subject of criticism in the private sector
is the law concerning employer threats, a subject involving both unfair
labor practice issues and laboratory conditions issues. One of the most
difficult issues in employer speech cases is ascertaining the true na-
ture of the employer's comments. An employer's freedom to express
its opinion in representation cases is guaranteed by the first amend-
ment and by section 8(c) of the NLRA.69 However, the employer's
opinions cannot be coercive in nature. Section 8(c) of the NLRA
provides:
The expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any provisions of this Act if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.7 0
Since the passage of section 8(c), the Board has attempted to balance
the employer's free speech rights with the employee's right to exercise
his or her section seven rights.71 The most difficult problem that
arises when determining whether an employer's statements constitute
a threat is distinguishing threats from predictions.72 However, some
commentators claim that "union supporters are not coerced by threats
of reprisal" and that this should not be a "basis for setting aside an
tique, 15 J. COLLEcTIVE NEGoIATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 107 (1986) (Author
contends that the differences between public sector and private sector labor rela-
tions are more meaningful than the similarities).
69. In NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941), the Supreme
Court held that employers have a constitutional right to express their opinions as
long as the statements are not coercive in nature. An employer's freedom to ex-
press noncoercive statements is also sanctioned by 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
71. A number of commentators have dealt with this issue. See Barksdale, Employer
Speech During Union Organizational Campaigns, 46 MIss. L.J. 401 (1975); Bok,
The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38 (1964); Christensen, Free Speech
Propaganda and the National Labor Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 213 (1963);
Field, Representation Elections Films and Free Speech, 25 LAB. L.J. 217 (1974);
Fields, Free Speech Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 LAB. L.J. 608 (1977); Hudson &
Werther, Section 8(c) and Free Speech, 28 LAB. L.J. 608 (1977); Koretz, Employer
Interference With Union Organization Versus Free Speech, 29 GEo. WAsH. L.
REV. 339 (1960); Pokempner, Employer Free Speech Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 25 MD. L. REv. 111 (1965).
72. See C. MoRRS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, 82-86 (1983). The Supreme Court
reviewed this problem in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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election or for finding an unfair labor practice...."73
Like the private sector, the public sector has had substantial expe-
rience with employers' pre-election threats of reprisal. The decisions
of state labor boards and courts indicate that states are concerned with
the effect that these pre-election campaign tactics have on public sec-
tor employees' freedom of choice. These decisions, however, do not
always make clear to what extent the private sector model is being
applied or limited. In some cases, it is apparent that the public agency
is unaware of the private model.
The majority of state board and court decisions have held that a
public employer unlawfully discourages employees from voting for a
union in a representation election when the employer makes threats
of reprisal against the workers. The most common threats made by a
public employer are that the employees will lose either their jobs (out-
right or by subcontracting the work) or benefits if a union is elected.
For example, in Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers, Local Union No. 53 v. Gallatin County Comm'rs,74 the Montana
Board of Personnel Appeals found that the employer committed an
unfair labor practice when it made statements claiming possible job,
vacation and benefit losses, and the contracting out of major work if
the union won.75 The Board concluded that these statements had the
73. J. GETMAN, J. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS:
LAW AND REALITY, 147 (1976). Some states have neglected to enact a provision
comparable to section 8(c) of the NLRA in their public employment relations
acts. See MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 423 (West 1978 & Supp. 1986); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4117 (Baldwin 1983). However, the Michigan Employment Rela-
tions Commission has permitted an employer to express opposition to unioniza-
tion despite the absence of any provision comparable to section 8(c) of the NLRA
in the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act. See Lapeer County General
Hosp. v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 79 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 41,721 (Mich. April 11,
1980). The Commission concluded that since the "PERA was drafted in 1965 af-
ter several decades of private sector labor relations during which employers exer-
cised freedom of speech.. ." and "[that] it could not be easily asserted that the
legislature intended to move public sector labor relations back to an era 'which
few, if any of the legislators had experienced.., based on a statutory interpreta-
tion which had long ago been judicially neglected and then legislatively erased."'
Id While the Ohio State Employment Relations Board has not gone as far as the
Michigan Employment Relations Commission, it has given some indication that it
is receptive to similarly interpreting the Ohio Public Employee Collective Bar-
gaining law. See Stark County Engineer v. American Fed'n of State, County and
Mun. Employees, Council 8, 2 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. 2333 (April 4, 1985)
(SERB dismissed an unfair labor practice charge against a union since there was
no "evidence that the union engaged in a restricting or coercive manner" when it
distributed false campaign leaflets). See generally Ashmus and Bumpass, supra
note 8, at 626.
74. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining
Cas.) 40,823 (Mont. Oct. 13, 1977).
75. Id.
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effect of "interfering with or coercing the employees in the exercise of
their rights."76 In Bridgton Fed'n of Public Employees v. Hamil,77
statements by town officials that if the union won, the current bene-
fits would be reduced to "ground zero" and renegotiated, and that cer-
tain work would be subcontracted out,78 prompted the Maine Labor
Relations Board to set aside the election. Such statements interfered
with the laboratory conditions necessary for a free and fair election.
While similar conclusions have been reached by the state labor boards
in Florida,7 9 New York,80 Pennsylvania,8l and Washington,82 the state
76. 1&
77. [1980-1983 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining
Cas.) 42,825 (Me. March 3, 1982). See also, Council No. 74, American Fed'n of
State, City and Mun. Employees v. Maine School Admin. Dist. No. 1, [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.)
41,696 (Me. Feb. 29, 1980) (Employer's letter to voters which stated that "in a
collective bargaining situation everything, including the benefits you now have
are negotiable.. ." was considered to be a threat which interfered with the labo-
ratory conditions of the election. A new election was ordered.); Teamsters Local
No. 48, State, County, Mun. and Univ. Employees v. City of Waterville, [1980-1983
Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.)
42,192 (Me. Oct. 31, 1980) (Employer's sudden requirement that employees work
the day before Christmas was contrary to its past practice and could be viewed as
an implied threat that conditions would be more difficult if a union was voted in.);
and Teamsters Local No. 48, State, County, Mun. and Univ. Employees v. Town of
Oakland, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub.
Bargaining Cas.) 40,775 (Me. Aug. 24, 1978) (Employer committed a prohibited
practice when it suspended fringe benefits during the organizational campaign).
78. Bridgton Fed'n of Pub. Employees v. Hamil, [1980-1983 Transfer Binder] (CCH)
(Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 42,825 (Me. March 3, 1982).
79. Laborers' Int'l Union, Local 666 v. Jes Parrish Memorial Hosp., [1977-1980 Trans-
fer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 40,182 (Fla.
Dec. 12, 1977) (A supervisor unlawfully advised employees that they would lose
benefits or sick leave if the union prevailed.); but see Local 218, Textile Proces-
sors, Service Trades, Health Care Professional and Technical Employees Int'l
Union v. Gadsden County Bd. of County Comm'rs, [1980-1983 Transfer Binder]
Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 42,562 (Fla. Nov. 12,
1981) (An employer's projection that if a "union won a representation election
county voters might reject a proposed bond issue necessary for the continued
funding.. ." of the employer, did not necessitate setting aside the election since
the threatened action was not in the control of the employer.); South Florida Am.
Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. City of North Miami, [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.)
40,753 (Fla. Nov. 16, 1978) (An employer's pre-election campaign statements
which claimed that all present employee benefits would become subject to collec-
tive bargaining were not so coercive in nature to warrant setting aside the
election).
80. Catskill Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. v. Local 32-E Serv. Employees Int'l
Union, [1980-1983 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bar-
gaining Cas.) , 42,843 (N.Y. Mar. 11, 1982) (An employer threatened employees
with loss of benefits if the union won).
81. Northeastern Educ. Intermediate Unit, [1980-1983 Transfer Binder] Pub. Em-
ployee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 41,894 (Pa. June 5, 1980) (The
1987]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
labor boards of Illinois8 3 and Missouri84 have not always been as ac-
commodating of employees' rights.
A few state courts have also addressed whether an employer's
statements constituted threats of reprisal. The Iowa Supreme Court,
in Mount Pleasant School Dist. v. PERB,85 stated that an employer's
pre-election notice which claimed that staff reductions were an "occa-
sional but real fact of life in the school business when our enrollment
is declining"S6 was not an implied threat of job elimination since it was
something outside of the employer's control. In a case heard by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, an employer was ordered to recognize the
employees' exclusive representative after the court found that the
city's acts constituted prohibited practices.87 The court affirmed the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission's findings that the em-
ployer's assertions that it would subcontract out work and discontinue
fringe benefits if the union won were coercive threats. 88 The Minne-
sota Court of Appeals affirmed a Minnesota Bureau of Mediation
Services order for a new election in Swift County - Benson Hospital
v. BMS.89 Though the employer's practices were not referred to as
threats, the state board and court agreed that the employer interfered
with employees' free choice by initiating layoffs, reducing hours, and
increasing work loads prior to a representation election.90
state board set aside an election where the employer representative predicted
that reprisals such as loss of benefits, reduced wage increases, and stricter en-
forcement of work rules would result if the union was voted in as the employees'
representative. The state board concluded that the employees were unsophistica-
ted and susceptible to the employer's threats).
82. Wellpinit Classified Pub. Employees Ass'n/WEA v. Wellpinit School Dist., [1980-
1983 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.)
43,357 (Wash. June 22, 1982) (Representation election was set aside when the em-
ployer made threatening statements that employees might lose their jobs if the
union won and that they would not get anything more by joining a union).
83. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Illinois Dep't of Com-
merce and Community Affairs, [1980-1983 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bar-
gaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 41,849 (Mll. April 14, 1980) (The Office
decided that the employer's decision to subcontract work did not discourage any
of the employees from voting for the union since none of the employees were in
the affected department).
84. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 96 v. Hickman Mills School Dist., [1980-1983
Transfer Binder) Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.)
42,455 (Mo. Jan. 7, 1981).
85. Mount Pleasant School Dist. v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 343 N.W.2d 472
(Iowa 1984).
86. 1& at 475.
87. Wisconsin Employees Relations Comm'n v. City of Evansville, 69 Wis. 2d 140,230
N.W.2d 688 (1975).
88. Id. The employer also promised future benefits if the employees would reject the
union.
89. 358 N.W.2d 458 (Minn. 1984).
90. Id.
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Finally, one state board not only reached a result inconsistent with
the NLRA, but reached this result by a method long discredited by the
NLRB. In Service Employees Intl Union, Local 96, v. Hickman Hills
School Dist, the state board of Missouri refused to set aside an elec-
tion despite the fact that the employer's supervisors told employees
that the employer would look into subcontracting work if the union
won the election.91 The Missouri State Board of Mediation based its
holding upon testimony by the employees claiming the statements
about subcontracting work did not intimidate them.9 2 Employee testi-
mony as to the effect of a speech has long been discounted in the pri-
vate sector. As the NLRB stated in its 1948 decision in G.H. Hess,
Inc.,93
[t]he determination of whether statements are coercive does not depend on
whether they have had the intended effect, or upon the subjective state of
mind of the hearer... the test of interference, restraint, and coercion under
section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not turn upon the success or failure of the at-
tempted coercion; rather the applicable test is whether the Employer engaged
in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free
exercise of the employee rights under the Act.
9 4
In summary, the available state board and court decisions indicate
that though some states have applied less restrictive standards than
the NLRB's in regulating speech of a threatening iature, the majority
of states still view the public employees as being in need of protection
from employer speech which might "interfere with, restrain or co-
erce" them in their right to choose or reject union representation.
Cases such as Hickman Hills demonstrate the need for state labor re-
lation boards to become familiar with the NLRA to at least consider
the validity of evidence before giving it weight.
B. Employer Promises and Grants of Benefits
With regard to promises and grants of benefits, the most promi-
nent private sector case is NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co.,95 in which the
Supreme Court held that an employer violates the law by expanding
employee benefits during a campaign. Such an expansion, the Court
91. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 96, v. Hickman Mills School Dist. [1980-1983
Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.)
42,455 (Mo. Jan. 7, 1981).
92. Id. One wonders, however, if the testimony can be considered reliable. An intim-
idated employee is likely to remain intimidated while testifying at a public hear-
ing in the presence of the employer.
93. 82 N.L.R.B. 463 (1949).
94. 1& at 463-64, n.3. The Board has consistently adhered to this principle. See Ma-
sonic Homes of Cal., Inc., 258 N.L.RPB. 41 (1981); Beaird-Poulan Div., 247
N.L.R.B. 1365 (1980); Aladdin Hotel, 229 N.L.R.B. 499 (1977); International Ladies
Garment Workers' Union, 214 N.L.R.B. 706 (1974).
95. 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
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held, constituted a "fist inside the velvet glove"96 and thus, a threat,
because employees are "not likely to miss the inference that the
source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future
benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged." 97 In
essence, the rationale is to presume coercion from conduct that is not
facially coercive.
In a recent article,98 Jackson and Heller criticize the Exchange
Parts rule and argue that it has been so broadly applied that all
promises and grants, even those that have no affect on an election, are
"indiscriminately equated with compulsive unfair labor practices." 99
They argue that the Exchange Parts presumption that all promises
and grants of benefits are coercive should be eliminated.100 In their
view, a representation election should be set aside, or an unfair labor
practice found, only when a grant or promise of benefit is found to
have provably coerced employees. Benefit grants and promises would
be considered lawful until proven otherwise. The authors argue that
the current rules encourage vast amounts of time consuming litigation
before the results of a representation election can be determined.
They claim, too, that the Exchange Parts rule promotes and encour-
ages "promise-fudging and campaign gamesmanship," and that
promises and grants are not "bribes" but rather "workplace economic
choices."'0' They argue employees should be free to consider these
economic promises in making their choice to vote for or against the
union, and that the Exchange Parts rule elevates "the unionization ob-
jective over those of economic improvement and free choice .. ."102
The Exchange Parts rule, it is claimed, is not consistent with the na-
tional labor policy of neutrality, and discourages the granting of bene-
fits that may improve an employee's standard of living.
An employer's grant or promise of benefits prior to a representa-
tion election has also been scrutinized by a number of state boards.
The state board decisions appear to be consistent with the NLRB's
view that in the absence of a legitimate business reason, or established
past practice, an employer's conferral or promise of benefits prior to a
representation election is inherently coercive. For example, in Clovis
Unified Teachers Ass'n v. Clovis Unified School Dist.,10s the Califor-
nia Public Employee Relations Board set aside a representation elec-
96. Id. at 409.
97. Id
98. Jackson & Heller, Promises and Grants of Benefits Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1982).
99. Id. at 5.
100. 1d
101. I at 57.
102. Id at 53.
103. 3 Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 43,800 (Cal. July 2,
1984).
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tion when the employer granted the final Saturday of the school year
as a nonwork day. Since the employer's action was not in accord with
any pre-existing plan or past practice, the PERB held that the confer-
ral of a benefit prior to a representation election to be unlawful. 0 4
The Florida Public Employees Relations Commission also appears to
agree in principle with the "fist inside the velvet glove" theory. In
Hillsborough County Police Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Temple Ter-
race,105 a representation election was set aside after the employer an-
nounced a wage increase seven days prior to the election. The
Commission noted that a wage increase granted prior to an election,
which is not in accord with any past practice, could be perceived to be
the result of an impending election.106 However, the Florida Public
Employees Relations Commission recognized in Laborer's Intl Union
of North America Local 1101 v. School Bd. ofAlachua,O7 that the the-
ory has limits. The conferral of a de minimis benefit, such as allowing
employees to take materials from the employer's scrap pile, was un-
likely to have influenced the employees in their votes, and therefore
did not warrant setting aside a representation election.
Where the conferral of a benefit is a customary practice, it is un-
likely that the employees will perceive the benefit as an attempt by
the employer to influence votes. In such situations, the representation
elections are not set aside merely because the conferral of the benefit
was close in time to the election.108 In one instance, the failure to
104. Id. The employer's continuation of a two percent pay raise was not an unlawful
grant of a benefit since that was part of a pre-existing plan.
105. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining
Cas.) 42,139 (Fla Dec. 16, 1980).
106. Id. See also Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'n v. IBEW, [1980-1983 Transfer
Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 42,135 (N.J.
Oct. 1, 1980) (The employer granted the employees a larger increase in salary
than was originally adopted in a previous plan. Since the employer could not
show that the new salary plan was motivated by purposes other than the upcom-
ing representation election the commission set aside the election.); Lucas County
Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Educ. Ass'n v. Lucas
County Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, Case No. 85-
UR-02-2996 (Ohio SERB, Sept. 25,1986) (The board found that the employer com-
mitted an unfair labor practice when it granted a wage increase and other bene-
fits to employees during a representation campaign. The board noted that though
there are exceptions to the general rule that no wage increase or other benefit
should be granted during a representation election campaign, none of the excep-
tions were applicable to the employer's case.)
107. 3 Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 44,189 (Fla. Aug. 22,
1984).
108. Matter of Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, Wis. Council 40,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining
Cas.) 40,780 (Wis. Sept. 26,1978) (A wage increase granted to employees two days
before a union filed a representation election petition did not warrant setting
aside the election since it had been the customary practice of the public employer
to grant equivalent wage increases at approximately the same time each year).
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grant a customary wage increase during the pendency of a representa-
tion election was deemed to unlawfully interfere with the employees'
organizational rights. In Hudson Valley Community College v. Hud-
son Valley Community College Non-Teaching Professional Org.,109 it
was customary for the college to grant merit based increases to its
nonteaching staff every September first. The employer's failure to
grant the annual raise to the employees covered by the petition "con-
veyed the coercive message that unionization could be costly to em-
ployees... ."110 Finally, one state has found that in some instances an
employer may confer benefits before a representation election if the
employer can show that it would be impractical to require the working
conditions to remain fixed from the time a pre-election campaign is
instituted."'l
C. "Captive Audience" Meetings
In the private sector, an employer may compel employees on paid
time, to attend an anti-union presentation on company premises.
These presentations are commonly referred to as "captive audience"
speeches. The NLRB limited this practice in Peerless Plywood," 2 by
holding that private employers and unions are prohibited from deliv-
ering captive audience speeches to groups of employees during the
twenty-four hours before an election. The Peerless Plywood rule has
received a mixed reception by the state labor boards, and one state
109. 3 Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 44,224 (N.Y. Aug. 13,
1985).
110. Id.
111. Polk County Police Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Lake Alfred, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 40,186 (Fla.
Nov. 18, 1977) (An employer lawfully provided its employees with a camera for
the department's use nine days prior to a representation election).
112. 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953). A "captive audience" speech is an employer campaign
tactic in which employees are compelled to attend, on paid time, an anti-union
speech or presentation by the employer. While the NLRB has, for almost forty
years, upheld the right of an employer to give captive audience speeches, the issue
has not always been without controversy. In 1946, the NLRB held that compel-
ling employees to listen to anti-union speeches on company time violated the Act
because it was necessary to protect employees against the employer's use of its
inherent economic power. Matter of Clark Bros. Co., Inc. 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946)
enforced 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947). The Board reversed its field and held captive
audience speeches legal in 1948. Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).
In 1951, the Board changed its view and held that while a captive audience
speech was not in and of itself illegal, the giving of such a speech carried with it a
duty to allow the union an equal opportunity to respond under equivalent condi-
tions. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951) enf. denied, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.
1951), cert denied, 343 U.S. 905 (1953). Finally, in 1953, the Board ruled in Living-
ston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 460 (1953), that an employer does not act illegally
by making a captive audience speech and denying the union's request for an equal
opportunity to reply.
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labor board has rejected the notion that an employer has any right to
conduct captive audience speeches. At the other extreme the Florida
Public Employees Relations Commission has expressly authorized
captive audience speeches and has further refused to adopt even the
twenty-four hour limitation rule in Peerless Plywood.113 Adopting a
compromise position in C/ovis Unified Teachers Ass'n v. Clovis Uni-
fied School Dist,114 the California Public Employment Relations
Board stated that the timing of a captive audience meeting is but one
factor to be considered in ascertaining whether the employees' votes
were influenced by the employer's conduct.11 5
The Ohio State Employment Relations Board has entirely rejected
the concept of captive audience speeches. In three different instances,
the board has found captive audience activity to be a per se violation of
the Ohio Act.n6 The Ohio Board has also made reference to the dif-
ferences between public and private sector captive audience speeches
noting, "[t]here are conceivable constitutional arguments against pub-
lic sector captive audiences which do not apply to private sector em-
ployers. At least it is arguable that a public sector employer's
compelled audience meets the state action element requisite to a claim
of violation of the 14th Amendment."'' 17 The Board did not, however,
113. The Florida Public Employees Relations Commission has held that an employer
did not act unlawfully by holding a captive audience meeting within 24 hours of
an election. The commission stated that it "will cure any pre-election abuses of
the free speech privilege through investigation of the circumstances, substance
and quality of the particular speech itself rather than through an outright prohi-
bition of speech during the 24 hour period preceding an election.... ." District
Council No. 66 Int'l Bhd. of Painters and Allied Trades v. Putnam County School
Bd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bar-
gaining Cas.) 40,856 (Fla. March 24, 1978).
114. 3 Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 43,800 (Cal. July 2,
1984).
115. Id. See also Williamsport Area Community College v. Pennsylvania Labor Rela-
tions Bd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub.
Bargaining Cas.) 40,542 (Pa. Oct. 7,1977) (An employer did not engage in unlaw-
ful campaign conduct since the employer merely stated that it expected, rather
than ordered, employees to be present at employer-employee meetings).
116. Hamilton County Welfare Dept., 3 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. 3036 (May 12,1986)
(Captive audience meeting was a "fatal flaw" which deprived the employees of a
"free and untrammeled" election environment); Ohio Council 8, American Fed'n
of State, County and Mun. Employees, 2 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. 2632 (June 5,
1985) (Captive audience speech required setting aside election results and con-
ducting new election); Ohio Council 8, American Fed'n of State, County and Mun.
Employees, 2 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. 2652 (Sept. 19, 1985) (Board stated that
though the employer has first amendment rights, these rights must be balanced
against the listener's first amendment rights). There is some precedent in early
NLRB decisions for the Ohio SERB's position, see note 112 supra.
117. Hamilton County Welfare Dept., 3 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. 3036, n.5 (May 12,
1986).
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further identify the nature of the constitutional argument it
envisioned.
IV. REGULATING UNION CAMPAIGN TACTICS
Related to the above issues, but presenting additional issues of its
own, is the question of to what degree an agency should regulate the
campaign tactics of a union. In NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing Co.,118
the Supreme Court held that pre-election solicitation of memberships
by the union coupled with a promise to waive the union's initiation fee
"allows the union to buy endorsements and paint a false portrait of
employee support during its election campaign."" 9 Thus, the Court
upheld the invalidation of a union election victory, partly on the ra-
tionale that the Act must be neutral in honoring the rights of those
opposing the union as well as those supporting it. The case and its
holding have been described by Professor Getman as demonstrating
one of the "foolish restrictions on union campaign tactics."12 0 First, it
is argued that the regulated practice has little effect on election out-
come and, second, that overturning a union victory is a more serious
matter than is overturning an employer victory.' 21 Overturning a
union victory denies representation to employees who voted for the
union, whereas overturning a union loss and ordering a second elec-
tion allows the company to continue to operate "free of the union - the
same result as the election would have provided - until a new election
is held ... ,"122 Thus, if the Savair rule was designed merely to assure
even-handed treatment of unions and employers, Professor Getman
argues that it fails to achieve its designed purpose.123
In the public sector, at least three states have addressed the issue
of union campaign tactics; none, however, have addressed the full
range of issues presented by Savair and its critics. In Amalgamated
Transit Union,124 the Washington Public Employees' Relations Com-
mission held that it was not unlawful for a union to provide an attor-
ney for employees the union was seeking to represent. The
employees' petition for an election had caused the need for legal rep-
resentation to prevent their dismissal. The union, therefore, had a le-
gitimate interest in conferring such benefits.
Similarly, in Hillsborough County Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v.
118. 414 U.S. 270 (1974).
119. Id at 277.
120. See Getman, supra note 33, at 69.
121. Id at 70.
122. I&
123. I&
124. 3 Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.) 43,835 (Wash. Nov.
16, 1983).
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City of Winter Haven, 25 the Florida Public Employees Relations
Commission held that statements by union officials concerning the
benefits provided exclusively to members of the union did not improp-
erly influence the results of a representation election. The Commis-
sion found that there was no indication that the benefits were
conditioned upon employee support for the union in the election. The
benefits were "an inducement to join the union, not an inducement to
vote for the union in the election."'1 26 And finally, in American Fed'n
of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Public Employee Relations
Comm., 27 the Public Employment Relations Commission of New
Jersey found that the dispensing of alcoholic beverages to potential
voters was not considered a reward for voting for the union.
V. REGULATING MISREPRESENTATION
Whether an election may be overturned because of substantial mis-
representation of fact is an issue that affects both unions and employ-
ers. It also presents an example of the difficulties found in following
NLRB precedent in a changing political world. The Board held in its
1962 Hollywood Ceramics Co.128 opinion that elections should be set
aside where there is an intentional or unintentional misrepresentation
involving a substantial departure from the truth that occurs at a time
preventing an effective reply, and which might "reasonably be ex-
pected to have a significant impact on the election."'129 This position
was reversed in 1977 in Shopping Kart Food Mkt, Inc.130 The Board,
relying in part on the Getman, Goldberg and Herman study,' 3 ' stated
that it would no longer review the truth or falsity of campaign propa-
ganda, but would, rather, rely on employees to discount such propa-
ganda. Less than two years later, in General Knit of California,132 the
Board overruled Shopping Kart and returned to the standards of
Hollywood Ceramics. Most recently, the Board, in Midland National
Life Insurance,133 overruled General Knit and returned to the rule of
Shopping Kart. In deciding that it will no longer set elections aside
based on misleading campaign statements, the Board stressed the
value of "definite, predictable and speedy results" 3 4 and the abilities
of employees as "mature individuals who are capable of recognizing
125. [1980-1983 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining
Cas.) 42,647 (FL. Feb. 24, 1981).
126. Id-
127. 114 N.J. Super. 463, 277 A.2d 231 (1971).
128. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
129. Id. at 224.
130. 228 N.L.R.B. 13U (1977).
131. J. GTuAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 73.
132. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
133. 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
134. Id. at 132.
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campaign propaganda for what it is and discounting it."135
The public sector has also had to contend with misrepresentations
made by employers and unions in pre-election campaigns. There have
been various responses by the states to the employer's use of this pre-
election campaign tactic. To date at least one state labor board has
expressly adopted the standards enunciated by the NLRB in Shopping
Kart, while two other states have adhered to the Hollywood Ceramics
rule. A few states have reviewed situations involving possible misrep-
resentations by employers and have refrained from explicitly adopting
either rule.136
In 1980, the Vermont Labor Relations Board purported to adopt
the Shopping Kart rule in International Union of Operating Engi-
neers Local 98 v. Town of Springfield.137 The board decided that it
would not set aside a second representation election in a situation
where the employer distributed a question and answer sheet to em-
ployees which contained the employer's views, arguments and opin-
ions.1 3 8 The board stated that though it would intervene in a situation
where the employer's method of misrepresentation was such that the
employees could not recognize that the material was campaign propa-
ganda, it would not otherwise analyze campaign propaganda for its
truth or falsity.13 9
In other jurisdictions, employer misrepresentations have been
scrutinized according to the former private sector rule of Hollywood
Ceramics. In Oregon State Employees Ass'n v. Department of Com-
135. Id.
136. Council No. 74, American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Bangor
Water Dist., [1980-1983 Tranfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub.
Bargaining Cas.) 42,205 (Me. Dec. 22, 1980) (Misrepresentations made by an em-
ployer that projected that employees "would lose contact with management be-
cause they would have to go through the union steward . . .", that employees
would have to pay excessive initiation fees and be subject to fines for nonattend-
ance, and that employees would be "required to contribute to or work in behalf of
a political candidate.. ." were false. Since the union was still successful in the
election a bargaining order was instituted rather than a new election); Missouri
Fed'n of Teachers, St. Charles Unit v. School Dist. of St. Charles, [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining Cas.)
41,845 (Mo. March 20, 1980) (The Missouri State Board of Mediation decided not
to set aside an election where the employer's pre-election statements made in a
letter mailed to employees stated that "employee problems would no longer be
confidential and that unionization would require increased employee supervi-
sion.... " The board held that the statements were not inaccurate or untrue. In
addition, the board stated that statements made at an employer's meeting three
days prior to the election were not improper since "the union had three days...
to respond to any misrepresentation.")
137. [1980-1983 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining
Cas.) 41,893 (Vt. June 5, 1980).
138. 1d This suggests that, in its willingness to review some misrepresentations, Ver-
mont has not adopted the entire Shopping Kart rule.
139. Id-
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merce,140 the Oregon Employment Relations Board reaffirmed its ap-
proval of the recently abolished Hollywood Ceramics rule. The
Oregon Board refused to set aside an election for alleged misrepresen-
tation by the employer. The Board stated that the union had suffi-
cient time to refute any misrepresentations made by the employer.14'
Likewise, in Mount Pleasant School Dist. v. PERB,142 the Iowa
Supreme Court reiterated Iowa's adherence to the Hollywood Ceram-
ics rule. In this case, the union complained of a notice posted by the
employer some thirty hours before the election. The notice stated,
among other things, that "[g]ood faith bargaining (includes rejecting) a
demand we feel in any way would put the school district in a bad posi-
tion" and that "bargaining starts with a bare table" and that "a collec-
tive bargaining agreement cannot guarantee against staff reduction
... ,"143 The Iowa Public Employee Relations Board hearing officer
concluded that these statements did not violate rules 5.4(3)(b) of the
Iowa Administrative Code'44 because the statements in the notice did
not "contain any substantial misrepresentations of fact or law .... ',145
However, the hearing officer decided that the statements in the notice
were perceived by the employees as a veiled threat. The full Public
Employee Relations Board agreed with the hearing officer and set
aside the election based upon the veiled threat. The District Court of
Iowa reversed the Public Employee Relations Board's decision to in-
validate the election but it affirmed PERB's conclusion under rule
5.4(3)(b) with regard to the misrepresentations.146 The Iowa Supreme
Court affirmed the district court.147 While the Iowa Supreme Court
noted that in Midland Natl Life Ins. Co. the NLRB had recently re-
turned to the misrepresentation tests set out in Shopping Kart, it did
not discuss this because the holding was that the notice did not violate
rule 5.4(3)(b).148
140. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) (Pub. Bargaining
Cas.) 40,662 (Or. Dec. 1, 1977).
141. Id.
142. 343 N.W.2d 472 (Iowa 1984).
143. Id. 474-75.
144. The rule reads:
5.4(3) Objectionable conduct during election campaigns. The follow-
ing types of activity, if conducted during the period beginning with the
filing of an election petition with the board and ending at the conclusion
of the election, and if determined by the board that such activity could
have affected the results of the election, shall be considered to be objec-
tionable conduct sufficient to invalidate the results of an election: ...
b. Misstatements of material facts by any party to the election or
their representative without sufficient time for the adversely affected
party to adequately respond.
145. 343 N.W.2d at 476.
146. Id
147. Id. at 485.
148. Id. at 480.
19871
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Thus, the status of campaign misrepresentations as a means to
overturn a representation election is as unclear in many states as it
has been in the private sector. What this suggests is that a state, even
when it adopts private sector precedent, ought do so in a reasoned
opinion which provides a rationale for future application. To merely
adopt the private sector model may be to provide little guidance for
the future in an area where private sector law is subject to frequent
change.
VI. CONCLUSION
The greatest developments in public sector labor law appear yet to
come. The NLRA remains, as it should, the primary model for adjudi-
cation in states' regulation of pre-election campaign conduct. Despite
the arguments of those who suggest that campaigns are too heavily
regulated and that employees' votes are rarely affected by campaign
tactics, the states seem most often to be at least as committed as the
NLRB to reviewing pre-election campaigns carefully to insure that
employees are not threatened, coerced, or otherwise restrained in ex-
ercising their free choice.
This substantial uniformity may be a recognition that the NLRA
model is still appropriate and that, in the view of most states, the crit-
ics are wrong. On the other hand, it may well be that the states have
not yet given full consideration to all the critics' arguments. A
number of issues have not been clearly raised or discussed. Most state
decisions, too, do not specifically address the issue of whether differ-
ences between public and private sector employers and employees
may require modification of private sector practices.
Recent cases such as those granting nonunion employee organizers
access to the workplace indicate that, in this area, some states are will-
ing to reject the private sector model. Whether such decisions reflect
agreement with critics of how the NLRA has been interpreted or are
based on differences between public and private property is not yet
clear. If the state boards and, ultimately, state courts will further ar-
ticulate and explain these decisions, they may become persuasive pre-
cedent in other jurisdictions. Ultimately, they may also affect the
interpretation of private sector labor law as well.
In summary, this is a formative period in public sector labor law.
Private sector labor law under the NLRA, which provides the model
and guide for most public sector labor law, is undergoing a re-exami-
nation. The states can participate in this re-examination, and in some
cases, may find a better way to serve the interests of employees and
employers. When they do, it is hoped that their published decisions
will explain: (1) why the NLRA model was accepted, rejected or mod-
ified; (2) how the NLRA model was modified or rejected and the limits
of such modification or rejection; and (3) the rationale and guiding
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principles behind such rejection or modification. Because rejection or
modification of typically accepted NLRA principles will leave parties
temporarily adrift, and the system in need of predictable guidelines,
such clear explanations will be necessary. Further, such explanations
will help those of us in other jurisdictions, in both the public and pri-
vate sectors, in our continued search for a more perfect system.
